THE 1789 CRISIS

Thus, if one may use that phrase to describe a nation that in reality had neither an American constitution nor a British one, there existed an underlying constitutional crisis in France in 1789. In reality, this ostensibly absolute monarchy was unable to enact the reforms that were most urgently required. There was a constitutional crisis layered with a financial crisis when it was forced to acknowledge its total insolvency as well. However, beneath these was a much more dire problem that added an extra explosive component to the entire scenario. It was the nation's much-underappreciated economic crisis brought on by protracted inflation.

France had taken in at least half of the precious metals sent into Europe between 1726 and 1780, and over the eighteenth century, her population had grown from about 18 to 25 million. Prices necessarily increased as a result of the greater use of metallic currency, the growth of credit facilities, the larger population's increased demand for products, and the comparatively sluggish expansion of output. Prices between 1785 and 1789 were sixty-five pc more than the average general prices of consumer goods between 1726 and 1741, and even during the lengthier period of 1771–1789, they were forty-five pc higher on average. The cost of living increased most sharply for individuals who were living closest to subsistence level, with average money wages rising only around one-third as quickly as prices. Nature herself compounded the issue. Large hailstones in 1788 contributed to the poor crops in 1787 and 1788. Extreme social unrest resulted from this, driving many hungry and desperate men into the few major towns. This was the catalyst for the introduction of violence, as it created the Paris mob and set the stage for the 1789 peasant riots, also known as the jacqueries, across the countryside.

It is only within the context of this severe economic and social crisis that the political crisis of 1789, which kicked off the sequence of events that led to the revolution, makes sense. The long-standing grievances that were included in the cahiers or lists of grievances prepared by the localities in anticipation of the Estates-General meeting in May 1789 were the lack of a "constitution" to prevent ministerial despotism, the necessity of reducing indirect taxes and controlling taxation through recurring national assemblies, the need to remove internal customs barriers, and the importance of press freedom. The rural populace's more pressing grievances were largely ignored in the assembly and removed from several cahiers. Their disregard only served to heighten their significance as a catalyst for violent disruption, leading to a widespread uprising in the rural areas throughout the summer of 1789.

The growing catastrophe might have been mitigated in a number of ways even though it could no longer be postponed. It is possible that a more resilient kind of constitutional monarchy would have developed if the King had been able to select and retain capable ministers who understood the demands of the current situation and to use the Estates-General to enact a comprehensive and well-defined program of constitutional and budgetary reforms. However, the personalities of all the major players worked against this possibility: the weak-willed but well-meaning King; the notoriously frivolous and extravagant Queen Marie Antoinette, whose Austrian connections made her extremely unpopular; the Comte de Mirabeau, the most capable statesman and debater who supported the monarchy but also the most personally disreputable and distrusted; and the royal entourage, which included the King's brothers, whose intransigence and irresponsibility contributed to the monarchy's demise.

Alternatively, the standoff might have been resolved peacefully and without resorting to violence if the privileged orders had been convinced to willingly give up their significant legal, administrative, and financial privileges. The National Assembly, officially known as the Third Estate, was formed on June 17 and was later joined by individual clergy and nobles. The famous surrender of feudal privileges took place within it on August 4, 1789, when liberal nobles fought each other to give up their long-standing rights and the clergy fought them to sacrifice tithes and church rights. However, that astounding outpouring of kindness was altered in a few ways. It is true that significant grievances were subsequently destroyed and that destruction occurred without compensation including the aristocratic immunity from taxes, serfdom, forced labor (corvee), and the monopolistic and judicial advantages of the nobles. However, other significant feudal debts were to be redeemed and commuted, and the National Assembly hoped to preserve the more significant feudal property rights by giving up the less significant ones. Even these sincere sacrifices were tainted by the fact that they were made a month too late, after the peasant movement across the countryside had started to burn chateaux, destroy feudal archives, and declare their own independence from feudal obligations, and after the Paris mob had experienced power with the fall of the Bastille on July 14. After bestowing upon Louis XVI, the title of "Restorer of French Liberty," the Assembly concluded its magnanimous gesture by proclamation that "the feudal regime is entirely destroyed." Frenchmen understood that the restoration of liberty was not a result of Louis, but rather the collective activity of the populace, and that the peasants, not the Assembly, were the true architects of the downfall of feudalism.

To be continued....