THE SITUATION OF REVOLUTION

It is paradoxical that in 1789, no powerful individuals or groups in France desired revolution. Like wars, revolutions can start for reasons other than popular desire. They take place as a result of people's desires for other things that, under certain conditions, put them at risk of revolution or conflict. Over the majority of the eighteenth century, what has been referred to as "the revolutionary spirit" had been building throughout Europe. This ethos, one of absolutist monarchy, privileged nobility, and rationalist critique against established forces such as the Roman Catholic Church, was especially encouraged by the writings of a unique group of French intellectuals and writers known as the philosophes. Men like Voltaire, Montesquieu, Diderot, and Rousseau became well-known and influential European leaders as a result of the widespread reading of their writings throughout the continent.

However, there is a hazy and distant link between their theories and the 1789 revolution. They did not advocate for revolution, and they were typically willing to support any absolute ruler who was willing to take them in as disciples. The majority of their readers were aristocrats, attorneys, businesspeople, and local officials, whose position in the current system was far from unpleasant, thus they were neither motivated to desire nor strive for revolution. Later, during the French Revolution, the philosophes' ideas were frequently invoked to support policies that the philosophes themselves would have disagreed with. Later on, the significance of their ideas grew; if they had any bearing on the start and early phases of the great revolution, it was only because they had encouraged a skepticism and disrespect for all established institutions. When the time came, they prepared men to challenge the very basis of the established system. In 1789, the ‘revolutionary situation' was what truly counted and drove people to become revolutionary practically against their will, and the philosophes' contributions to that circumstance were not very significant.

The King, the cornerstone of the entire French social and political establishment, was in dire financial circumstances, which was the basis of the "revolutionary situation." A decade prior, other ministers had attempted, but all had failed, to put royal finances on a more stable foundation. The traditional sources of royal wealth were insufficient to cover the expenditures of wars, and government expenses were rising quickly. Being hard up was nothing new for a French monarch; in fact, it was the typical circumstance. But the nation was heavily burdened, for the numerous ways by which he could legitimately raise taxes had already been so thoroughly and wastefully exhausted. France was a tremendously big, populous, wealthy, and powerful state by historical standards. Five times as much was traded overseas for her since Louis XIV's death in 1715. Compared to other European states, she boasted the largest middle class comprised of small manufacturers and businessmen, as well as a generally wealthier peasantry. Two fifths of the soil belonged to the peasants, who also worked nearly all of it. However, it was precisely these facts that created the "revolutionary situation." People who have something to lose rather than just something to gain tend to be the ones who are most willing to improve society as it is. And in 1789, that was the main thought on people's minds. Demands for improved government, more equitable and efficient taxation and administrative procedures, and correction of specific abuses were persistent. The majority of people realized that a bloody and destructive revolution might rob them of their possessions without granting them their desired goals, therefore they had no desire for it.

When Louis XVI announced that he intended to call a meeting of the Estates General the closest thing France had to a national parliament He gained significant support. Since it was customary for the monarch to protect the majority of his subjects from mistreatment and hardship, his actions inspired expectations for liberal and constitutional reforms. No one of significance desired a republic, just as no one of significance desired a revolution. Before a significant republican movement emerged in 1792, reformers' aspirations were directed toward the King rather than away from him. However, the King's well-received call for the Estates General to meet sparked the revolution. France's political and governmental system has become far smaller than its economic and social structure. The nation was divided between politically and economically powerful sectors that were sharply and bitterly resented opposed to one another. The nobility and the higher clergy, who were the two classes most removed from the peasantry and middle classes in attitude and interests, were granted unique advantages under her conventional legal and political system. Aristocrats occupied many of the highest positions in the Church, and these two groups of the governing elite shared a great deal in common. Every bishop was a nobleman by Louis XVI's reign, and aristocrats essentially controlled all of the army's and government's top positions. With a total population of only approximately 500,000 compared to a population of 24 or 25 million, political power was centralized in the hands of a small number of individuals. One of the most intense complaints of the increasingly affluent class of merchants, businessmen, financiers, and attorneys was that, despite owning a significant portion of the land collectively, they were unable to hold most of the more respectable and responsible positions in the government and church due to their social standing and place of birth. Furthermore, the middle classes and the wealthier peasants were primarily responsible for covering the costs of the state and church due to the numerous tax exemptions enjoyed by clergy and nobility. They had an instant chance to exert their political influence through their social and economic clout when the Estates-General were called in. They grabbed the opportunity headlong. Louis helped to solidify the by not only igniting aspirations for liberal reform but also uniting many of the individuals who were most hungry for a change in the social and political order. He brought the representatives of the unprivileged orders, the Third Estate of the middle class and peasantry, up against the representatives of the privileged orders, the First and Second Estates of clergy and nobility. Then, with no clear intentions or direction, the King started a series of events that ultimately led to his own collapse by trying to address this catastrophic situation using antiquated practices and creaking, rusted gear. Republicans didn't become more prevalent until after he had lost the public's initial support due to his lack of a clear platform, inconsistent and unsatisfactory behavior, and, ultimately, his outright betrayal of his own commitments. In France in the eighteenth century, only the king could have established a republic.

Even the King and his ministers were caught in a difficult situation. The situation was revolutionary from the start because, despite their best efforts, the king and his ministers were unable to meet the demands of the middle classes and peasants for a greater political power and taxation without uprooting the complex web of historical rights that gave the Church and nobles exclusive access to the most lucrative positions in the state, their own courts and jurisdiction, and immunity from the majority of taxes. They were unable to accomplish this without contesting and altering France's whole social and political system, which was a fundamental aspect of the previous system and the foundation of their own power. Based on the centuries-old accumulation of feudal relationships between the king, the nobility, the clergy, and the entire populace known as the "Third Estate," the French monarchy was a feudal monarchy. The privileged orders' rights and immunities were based on the same principles as the king's right to rule. Any attack on one portion of this strange and ancient structure implied an attack on all the other portions as well, even the royal power itself. The king's power was considered absolute, nevertheless, only to the extent that no recognized public authority could check or deny the king's ability to rule as he pleased. Only the violent resistance of overbearing lords or the obstructionist actions of local parliaments both reactionary and no reformist forces had previously been able to prevent it. The king, who asserted his unlimited power and claimed to govern by Divine Right, was actually trapped in a system that limited his autonomy in matters of jurisdiction, forced him to rule through socially favored orders, and forced him to finance his reign by unfair and inefficient financial practices. His power was arbitrary and not absolute, derived only from prescription rather than divine authority. The only monarch who could have avoided the predicament was one who was ready to be a revolutionary.

It was a situation of impasse and stalemate, where prudence was impeding progress and indifference was the only thing preventing revolution. The fact that the scenario had persisted for such a long time may be the main reason for astonishment as it could not have continued eternally. Other governments have already emerged from similar circumstances, most notably Great Britain and Prussia. Great Britain did it by developing strong parliamentary institutions, while Prussia did so by consolidating more substantial power within her monarchy. During the Estates-General meeting, other suggestions were made regarding how France should address the issue in a similar manner. The argument made by Abbe Sieyes, who went on to become one of the most unstoppable constitution writers of the following 20 years, was the most appealing and convincing of these. He posed the important query, "What is the Third Estate?" in his pamphlet, which was extensively read by the Estates General. In response, he said that although it affected almost everyone, it didn't matter because it was the same as the country but wasn't included in its governance. Many people previously had this belief, but Sieyes summarized it in January 1789.